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The Complexity of Regulatory
Capture:
Diagnosis, Causality, and Remediation
Sidney A. Shapiro*
The United States has recently suffered from two
extraordinary calamities caused by the failure to regulate
effectively: the 2008 Wall Street collapse and the explosion of BP's
Deepwater Horizon oil rig. Regulatory capture has been
implicated in both failures.' This article considers when capture
occurs, what causes it, and what can be done about it, all
challenging issues.
Deciding whether an agency is captured can be complicated.
In some situations, such as the BP oil spill, there is an abject
failure to protect the public in circumstances where regulated
entities had considerable influence over the agency, suggesting a
clear case of capture. In other situations, an agency adopts
policies favored by regulated entities, but the regulatory issues are
* University Chair in Law, Wake Forest University. An earlier version of
this paper was presented at a symposium on "Blowout: Legal Legacy of the
Deepwater Horizon Catastrophe," held at the Roger Williams University
School of Law, in April 2011. The author appreciates the comments and
suggestions of fellow panelists and members of the audience.
1. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, The Government's Elite and Regulatory
Capture, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 11, 2010, 2:00 PM), http://dealbook.
nytimes.com/2010/06/11/the-governments-elite-and-regulatory-capture/; Dan
Froomkin, Regulatory Capture of Oil Drilling Agency Exposed In Report,
HUFFINGTON POsT (Sept. 9, 2010, 5:48 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/09/08/report-illustrates-regulan_709681.html.
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contestable, making it unclear whether the policies constitute
regulatory failure. Section I contends we should also presume
capture when the agency consistently adopts policies proposed by
regulated entities because this situation suggests a failure to
adopt a precautionary approach towards protecting the public.
Section II addresses how capture occurs according to the
standard explanation based on public choice economics, which
focuses on the relative advantages that regulated entities have
over the public in organizing to influence regulatory policies. In
this account, regulated entities have used their superior political
influence to capture individual agencies and to persuade Congress
and the President to adopt procedures that slow the regulatory
process and make it more difficult to regulate.
The dynamics of capture, however, are more complex than
indicated by public choice analysis. The public choice accounts
assume regulators are self-interested, but there is considerable
evidence that public officials also have other-regarding motives.
Section III explains how regulatory capture can occur despite the
desire of public officials to protect the public. It focuses on how
regulated entities are able to dominate the presentation of
information to agencies, producing information asymmetries that
make it more likely agencies will adopt industry-favored policies.
Section IV discusses an additional aspect of capture. Since
the 1980s, conservative interests have spent billions of dollars to
influence public opinion about government, far outspending
progressive interests. Part of this effort is focused on legitimizing
markets and delegitimizing the regulation of them. There has
also been an effort to reinforce a psychological tendency of
individuals to assume that people are responsible for the bad
things that happen to them. The reinforcement of this tendency
makes people skeptical of the necessity of government regulation,
a result described as "deep capture."2 These efforts have made it
more difficult for progressive interests to rally the public to oppose
regulatory capture.
Section V discusses what can be done to decrease capture.
The initial problem is to build political momentum for reform, a
difficult proposition in light of the successful efforts of
conservative interests to influence public opinion against
2. See infra notes 123-132 and accompanying text.
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government regulation. Assuming there is the political will to act,
one option is to make agencies more resistant to capture through
institutional redesign. Section V discusses several ways that this
may be accomplished, including establishing a strong and vibrant
civil service as a bulwark against capture. Increasing
transparency in the regulatory process is another option. Section
V proposes several ways to make industry domination of the
regulatory process more obvious, thereby alerting the public that
the regulatory process is being subverted.
I. WHAT IS CAPTURE?
The concept of capture is elusive. It is used both as a
description of which interests prevail before an agency and as a
normative criticism of agency practice. In the first derivation,
capture describes the power relationships in an agency. An
agency is captured when regulated entities have substantial
influence over policymaking. In the second derivation, it is an
accusation that the agency has failed to serve the public interest,
as Congress intended. The failure to make this distinction can be
problematic, as will be developed.
Both definitions are satisfied when there is a clear failure to
protect the public in circumstances where regulated entities had
considerable influence over an agency. Consider, for example, the
failure of the Mineral Mining Service (MMS) to prevent the BP oil
spill. We now know that the oil industry largely drove policy
decisions in the agency.3 At the same time, there can be little
doubt that the result did not serve the public interest, having
resulted in the death of eleven workers and the worst
environmental disaster in the United States.4
When industry influence does not produce clear regulatory
3. ALYSON FLOURNOY ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSiVE REFORM,
REGULATORY BLOWOUT: How REGULATORY FAILURES MADE THE BP DISASTER
POSSIBLE, AND HOW THE SYSTEM CAN BE FIXED To AVOID A RECURRENCE 3
(2010), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/BPReg_
Blowout_1007.pdf (noting that "[olver the course of several administrations,
the MMS was 'captured' by the oil industry, and came to see industry, rather
than public, as its constituency," and that this "made regulators particularly
subject to pressure and influences from industry," producing "an appalling
lack of energy in its efforts to protect against industry excesses").
4. Rebecca M. Bratspies, A Regulatory Wake-Up Call: Lessons from
BP's Deepwater Horizon Disaster, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. ENvTL. L. J. 7, 8 (2011).
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failure, capture is more difficult to establish because a diagnosis of
capture turns on whether the policies adopted by an agency are in
the public interest. And, as Lawrence Baxter notes, "Uljust
because the result is supported by a powerful and organized group
does not necessarily imply that it is wrong."5 Moreover, there is
no operational definition of the "public interest" in the literature.
Instead, scholars use the term as a straw man to create a
distinction between a captured agency and a non-captured
agency. 6
Without a clear definition of the public interest, it is
necessary to sort out whether an agency's choice of industry-
favored policy options is consistent with the goals that Congress
set for the agency. In other words, capture, as a normative
matter, occurs "whenever a particular sector of the industry,
subject to the regulatory regime, has acquired persistent influence
disproportionate to the balance of interests envisaged when the
regulatory system was established."7 But this requires the
difficult tasks of identifying when "influence" is persistent and
what "balance of interests" Congress intended.8
One way to avoid this difficulty is to define capture as
occurring when agencies consistently adopt regulatory policies
favored by regulated entities. This definition recognizes that most
regulatory statutes are aspirational; they seek the greatest degree
of protection that is reasonable taking into account regulatory
costs and other considerations. 9 In other words, the goal of
aspirational statutes is to protect the public's interests to the
5. Lawrence G. Baxter, Essay, "Capture" in Financial Regulation: Can
We Channel It Toward the Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
175, 177 (2011).
6. DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE
AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 36-37 (2010).
7. Baxter, supra note 5, at 176.
8. See id.
9. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKsMAN, RISK REGULATION AT
RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 52 (2003) (explaining how Congress
expects agencies to do "the best [they] can" to protect people and the
environment); Kristin E. Hickman & Claire A. Hill, Concepts, Categories, and
Compliance in the Regulatory State, 94 MINN. L. REv. 1151, 1174 (2010)
("regulatory statutes tend to articulate the policy goals or administrative
tasks that Congress seeks to accomplish, either explicitly through special
sections dedicated to that function or implicitly by express behavioral
requirements using aspirational or purposive language.").
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greatest extent possible taking into account other statutory
criteria. 10 If Congress intended to maximize the protection of the
public, it is objectionable as a normative matter that an agency
persistently chooses regulatory policies in response to industry
influence. After all, it is a safe bet that the goal of the regulatory
industry is to minimize the degree of stringency of regulations, if
not avoid regulation altogether.
When we see an agency consistently adopting regulatory
policies favored by regulated entities, both the political and
normative dimensions of capture appear to be met. This situation
therefore raises a presumption of capture, opening the door for the
agency or regulated entities to defend the agency's policy choices
as the best the agency could do under its mandate to protect the
public.
II. PUBLIC CHOICE DYNAMICS
However, once one defines capture, there is also a question of
how capture occurs. The public choice literature is the earliest
and still dominant explanation of the dynamics of capture.
Focusing on a comparative advantage enjoyed by businesses in
influencing government, this literature predicts that business
interests will influence Congress and agencies in ways that are
favorable to them. This section briefly describes the mechanism
by which business interests influence government, and how they
have used this influence to further their economic interests.
A. Political Marketplaces
The public choice explanation for capture is well known and
10. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §346a(b)(2)(A), (c)(2)(A) (2006) (requiring FDA to
be "reasonabl[y] certain[]" that pesticide residues will not harm people); 29
U.S.C. § 651(b) (2006) (empowering Occupational Health and Safety
Administration "to assure so far as possible every working man and woman
in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions"); 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)
(2006) (EPA is to provide for "protection and propagation of fish, shellfish,
and wildlife and . . . recreation"); 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4)(A)-(B) (2006)
(requiring EPA to set a maximum contaminant level (MCL) for drinking
water that comes as close as "feasible" to achieving the level at which no
known or anticipate adverse health effects will occur, allowing an adequate
degree margin of safety); 42 U.S.C. §7409(a)(2), (b)(1) (2006) (requiring EPA
to set primary ambient air quality standards that, allowing for an adequate
margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health).
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will be only briefly described here. It models legislative decisions
as a marketplace in which interest groups "demand" certain
legislative policy outcomes, and legislators favor the outcomes of
those groups that offer the most support for reelection in return
for these outcomes." Business interests are in a better position to
influence legislative outcomes than the mass of citizens because it
is easier for them to become politically organized.12 Reflecting this
imbalance, business interests obtain legislative outcomes that are
favorable to them.13
One difficulty with this description is that administrators are
not elected, at least at the federal level, and therefore are not in
need of electoral support. How then are agencies captured? As
will be elaborated below, the literature offers three general
answers. Congress can write substantive mandates that favor
business interests or procedural requirements that hamstring
agencies.' 4 Business interests can persuade members of Congress
to pressure agencies not to regulate or adopt weak regulations,15
and can influence the White House to appoint administrators
hostile to an agency's mission. 16  Finally, since administrators,
like legislators, are considered to be self-interested, public choice
analysis predicts they will adopt policies favored by business
interests because they are in a better position than regulatory
beneficiaries to assist agency officials in securing their personal
preferences.' 7
The public choice literature description fails to offer a
complete explanation for government behavior because it cannot
11. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE:
A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 21-22 (1991).
12. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTION ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 141-45 (1965).
13. MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF
POLITICAL MARKETS passim (1981).
14. The previous regulation of prices and exit and entry in
transportation markets furnish the canonical illustration. See George J.
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Scl. 3,
3 (1971) ("A central thesis of this paper is that, as a rule, regulation is
acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its
benefit.").
15. Steven Croley, Interest Groups and Public Choice, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 49, 72 (Daniel A. Farber &
Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010) [hereinafter Croley, Interest Groups].
16. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
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account for legislative and administrative actions that have
resulted in protection of the public over the strong objection of
regulated entities. Public choice dynamics fail for several reasons.
First, public officials are not entirely self-interested, and will
therefore act to serve the public's interests rather than their
own.18  Second, public interest groups have found ways to
overcome some of the collective action problems that stymie the
organization of citizens. 19 Third, elected officials, who act as
policy entrepreneurs, represent the interests of the politically
unorganized public in order to draw attention to an issue and gain
their electoral support.20
This is not the place for an extended discussion of when public
officials will and will not act in their own self-interest or of what
factors affect this behavior.21 My point is that public interest
dynamics explain capture, even though capture is not
automatically produced by these dynamics. 22 But, even if capture
occurs infrequently, the damage to the public can be severe, as the
country's recent experiences with the 2008 Wall Street collapse
18. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the
Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 577, 598-603 (2011) (noting that there is evidence to support
both that public officials are self-interested and other-regarding); see also
Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public
Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG.
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 167 (1990) (offering a theory explaining public interest
outcomes as the result of other-regarding behavior).
19. See Jack L. Walker, The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups
in America, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 390, 397-98 (1983) (explaining that public
interest groups have been able to organize and maintain themselves by
finding sponsors, reducing the transaction costs of reaching out to potential
members, and offering tangible economic benefits that can only be obtained
by joining).
20. See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES
122-23 (2d ed. 1995).
21. For a consideration of this issue, see STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION
AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT
242-257 (2008) [hereinafter CROLEY, REGULATION] (describing and discussing
the literature on the success of public choice in predicting government
behavior and regulatory outcomes).
22. See Croley, Interest Groups, supra note 15, at 64-65 ("So, maybe the
public choice argument is incomplete, but its most general conclusion
nevertheless holds: Rent seeking interest groups rule, at least as an
approximation.").
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and the BP oil spill indicate. 23  Other recent, but less visible
failures to regulate have also led to needless death and
destruction.24
B. Pathways to Capture
One of the reasons that capture is a complicated phenomenon
is that there are a number of ways by which it occurs. These
include substantive legislation that favors business interests, self-
interested and ideologically motivated behavior by administrators,
the defunding of agencies, and the imposition of procedural
obstacles to rulemaking.
1. Industry Oriented Mandates
The usual account of regulatory capture focuses on the failure
of agencies to protect the public or the environment. This failure,
however, can be pre-ordained because it is built into an agency's
mandate. It should be no surprise that corporations are able to
use their political muscle to obtain legislation friendly to their
economic interests. The United States Code is chock full of tax
breaks, subsidies, and regulatory loopholes that are questionable
from a public policy perspective. 25  When these benefits are
delivered by administrative agencies, the agency might be
described as captured, but the agency is simply carrying out its
defective mandate. 26
This form of capture can occur in a more subtle form, as the
behavior of MMS illustrates. MMS had a dual mandate. It was
responsible for promoting the economic success of oil drilling in
the Gulf and for ensuring that drilling was done safely and
23. SIDNEY SHAPIRO, RUTH RUTENBERG & JAMES GOODWIN, CTR. FOR
PROGRESSIVE REFORM, SAVING LIVES, PRESERVING THE ENVIRONMENT, GROWING
THE ECONOMY: THE TRUTH ABOUT REGULATION 7 (2011), available at
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/RegBenefits_1109.pdf (estimating
the costs of the oil spill as between $11-100 billion, and that pension funds
lost $2.8 trillion dollars as the result of the Wall Street collapse).
24. Id. at 8 (showing the significant costs associated with the failure to
regulate day-to-day hazards that impose significant harms on the American
public and the environment).
25. See Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV.
339, 361 (1988) (discussing legislation yielding industry rents passed by
Congress).
26. Baxter, supra note 5, at 177.
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without damage to the environment. This institutional "conflict of
interest" deterred MMS from being a strong regulator because the
result would have been to slow the development of oil resources.27
2. Hostile Administrators
Public choice analysis, which regards agency officials as self-
interested,28 predicts officials will choose regulatory policies that
further their own careers and interests. 29 These interests include
retention of their jobs,30 or even better, larger budgets and an
increase in personnel,31 which yields greater power. Since
regulated entities have influence over legislators, including the
ones who control the agency's budget, regulators have an incentive
to be friendly to regulated entities, in order to achieve these
objectives.32
Agency officials have an additional incentive to favor industry
interests. Because regulators will be seeking employment with
regulated entities after government service, or have come from
industry and intend to return, they will pull their punches to
remain on good terms with future employers. This problem is
usually described as the "revolving door" problem to indicate that
the movement of government employees in and out of industry
creates a type of conflict-of-interest. 33
Anti-regulatory administrators may also have an ideological
27. See FLOURNOY ET AL., supra note 3, at 24 (finding that "MMS's
mandate was skewed to advance development of energy resources with
insufficient attention to health, safety, and the environment, thereby
encouraging this identification of the agency with the industry" and that "the
agency was structured without any measures to ensure that those officials
charged with permitting and enforcement were completely independent of
those charged with collecting revenue for the government from oil and gas
operations, thus creating a potential conflict of interests").
28. Steven J. Eagle, Economic Salvation in a Restive Age: The Demand
for Secular Salvation Has Not Abated, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 569, 574
(2006) ("Public choice theory posits that legislators, executive branch officials,
and agency administrators are in business for themselves; that is, they are
motivated by the same types of incentives that motivate their counterparts in
the private sector.").
29. CROLEY, REGULATION, supra note 21, at 26-27.
30. Id. at 17.
31. WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 197 (1971).
32. CROLEY, REGULATION, supra note 21, at 14-25, 53-76.
33. Id. at 49.
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motivation. Administrators hostile to the missions of their
agencies can have a genuine belief in small government, and they
may spend their time in office trying to reduce regulation for this
other-regarding reason. 34 The two motivations - self-interest and
ideology - are difficult to distinguish in practice. For example,
being loyal to the President's ideology can enhance an
administrator's post-government employment prospects, making
him or her more attractive to think tanks, corporations, and other
similar employers.
Tom McGarity has demonstrated how Presidents Reagan and
George W. Bush were able to slow, or even stop, regulatory efforts
in a number of regulatory agencies by the appointment of
administrators hostile to regulation. 35 Having won an election, a
president who is skeptical of regulation is entitled to appoint
administrators who likewise are skeptical of regulation. But this
also means that the President is free to reward his business
backers, and seek their reelection support, by opposing effective
regulatory efforts, very much a public choice dynamic. President
Reagan was explicit about this agenda when he appointed a White
House Task Force on Regulatory Relief, headed by then Vice-
President George H.W. Bush.36 In the administration of George
W. Bush, Vice-President Cheney took on this role, but behind the
scenes.37
34. See Shapiro & Wright, supra note 18, at 605 (noting that anti-
regulatory presidential administrations, beginning with the Reagan
Administration, selected presidential appointees on the basis of their
ideological affinity).
35. Thomas 0. McGarity, Freedom to Harm: The Lasting Legacy of the
Laissez Faire Revival 119, 122 (June 7, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author) [hereinafter McGarity, Freedom to Harm] (Thorne Aucther
(Reagan) and John Henshaw (George W. Bush) at the Occupational Health
and Safety Administration); id. at 120, 122 (Ford B. Ford (Reagan) and David
Laurinski (George W. Bush) at the Mine Safety and Health Administration);
id. at 137-38, 141 (James Watt (Reagan) and Steven Griles (George W. Bush)
at Interior); id. at 157, 170 (Arthur Hull Hayes and Frank E. Young (Reagan)
and Dan Troy (George W. Bush) at the Food and Drug Administration); id. at
194 (Robert Blanchette (Reagan) at the Federal Railroad Administration); id.
at 197 (Joseph M. Clapp (George W. Bush) at the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration); id. at 198 (Marion C. Blakey (George W. Bush) at the
Federal Aviation Administration).
36. Id. at 97.
37. See RENA STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE'S AGENTS AND THE
BATTLE TO PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: SPECIAL INTERESTS, GOVERNMENT,
AND THREATS TO HEALTH, SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 127-28 (2010)
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The success of the White House in slowing or preventing
regulation depends on a number of circumstances, particularly
whether Congress opposes such efforts. 38  Moreover, no White
House will be able to head off all regulatory efforts. 39  Judicial
review also puts a brake on deregulatory efforts. 40  Still, the
appointment of administrators hostile to regulation is now a
regular tactic employed to weaken agency regulations and ensure
business-friendly regulatory policies.
3. Insufficient Funding
While the appointment of administrators hostile to regulation
is a well-recognized tactic, another method of capture has received
less attention. Budget cuts have prevented agencies from carrying
out their regulatory missions.4 1
When Rena Steinzor and I examined the budgets of the five
largest health and safety agencies,42 we found three things to be
true. First, with the exception of FDA, none of the agencies had
received significant increases in their budgets since 1980.43 FDA
has received moderate funding increases, but only to accelerate its
process for approving new drugs," leaving its other functions,
such as protecting the food supply, short of money. Second, the
regulatory responsibilities of the agencies has substantially
increased, putting greater strain on existing resources. 45 Finally,
(describing Vice-President Cheney's role).
38. See McGarity, Freedom to Harm, supra note 35, at 113 (noting that
after Democrats took control of both houses of Congress in 2007
"[d]eregulation was no longer on the agenda as Congress began the slow
process of rebuilding the institutions of responsibility and accountability").
39. Shapiro & Wright, supra note 18, at 583.
40. McGarity, Freedom to Harm, supra note 35, at 142 (noting that
during the George W. Bush administration the "EPA lost a surprising
number of judicial challenges brought by environmental groups in which the
courts held that its actions were prohibited by the plain language of the
relevant statutes").
41. STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 55-56.
42. The agencies were the Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA), and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).
Id. at 65.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at65-66.
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all of the agencies have floundered in addressing pressing
regulatory problems, a symptom that is attributable in large part
to a lack of funding.46
The idea of using budget cuts to slow down agency
enforcement and rulemaking efforts in administrations hostile to
regulation dates back to the Reagan administration, and this
tactic was also popular in the George W. Bush administration.47
While budget cuts are not normally mentioned as a tool of
regulatory capture, they have this impact. Legislators friendly to
business interests support the budget cuts, and regulated entities
get the benefit of reduced enforcement, or even non-enforcement of
the health, safety, and environmental laws.48
4. Rulemaking Ossification
Budget cuts reduce regulatory effectiveness, in part, because
agencies have been hobbled by a series of procedural hurdles,
found both in legislation and a series of presidential orders.49
With smaller staffs and less money, agencies find it more difficult
to finish regulations because there are more procedural hurdles to
overcome,50 a phenomenon known as "rulemaking ossification."51
46. Id. at 5. We found that all of these agencies are dysfunctional, as
indicated by their failure to address either pressing catastrophic risks or
longer-term systemic risks to people and the environment, id. at 6-36, and we
found that the lack of funding was responsible. Id. at 56.
47. See, e.g., McGarity, Freedom to Harm, supra note 35, at 98
("[e]specially severe cuts to agency enforcement budgets" in the Reagan
administration "produced dramatic declines in inspections, citations, and
prosecutions"); id. at 99-100 ("[rlepeated cuts to agency budgets" in the
Reagan administration "caused them to abandon proactive rulemaking except
for a few deregulatory initiatives and rules implementing specific statutory
mandates"); id. at 110 (during its first term, the George W. Bush
administration "was able to achieve many of the business community's goals
administratively by weakening existing regulations, slicing regulatory agency
budgets, and cutting back on enforcement").
48. See STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 66-67 (attributing funding
shortages in part to anti-regulatory influences).
49. See The Federal Rulemaking Process, PUBLIC CITIZEN,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Regulations-Flowchart.pdf (last visited on
Nov. 21, 2011) (providing a map of the complexity of procedural and
analytical requirements in rulemaking).
50. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DuKE L.J. 1385, 1437-41 (1992) [hereinafter
McGarity, Ossification] (indicating the slowdown in rulemaking).
51. Id. at 1385-86; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking and the
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Nowadays it regularly takes five years or more to finish important
regulations.5 2
Procedures are important to ensuring accountability and
fairness in the administrative process, but there has to be a
reasonable balance between accountability, fairness, and
administrative efficiency.53 For regulatory opponents, however,
the goal is to support additional procedures in the name of
accountability and fairness, regardless of the impact of additional
procedural burdens on regulatory output. Congress' failure to
account for administrative efficiency can be attributed to the
superior influence that corporations and their allies have in
Congress as compared to public interest groups, another outcome
of public choice dynamics.
I have previously described this effort to monkey wrench the
administrative process as "sophisticated sabotage."5 4  Adding
procedures is a politically appealing way to capture regulatory
agencies because additional procedures can be sold to the public as
important to ensuring accountability and fairness.55 Moreover, as
I will discuss later, the business community has paved the way for
this argument by an extensive and expensive campaign to
Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA L.J. 185, 195 (1996).
52. See McGarity, Ossification, supra note 50, at 1388-90 (rules take five
years or longer); see also CARNEGIE COMMISSION, RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
IMPROVING REGULATORY DECISION MAKING 106-09 (1993) (describing causes of
the lengthy process); Royal C. Gardner, Public Participation and Wetlands
Regulation, 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 6 n.28 (1991) (noting that some
informal rulemakings can take up to ten years to complete); Scott Schang &
Teresa Chan, Federal Greenhouse Gas Control Options from an Enforcement
Perspective, 2 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 87, 115 (2010) (noting that
"EPA rulemakings often take several years to be worked into final rules,
which then face several additional years of court challenges.").
53. See Paul R. Verkuil, The Ombudsman and the Limits of the
Adversary System, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 845, 855 (1975) (insisting that
administrative procedure must "comport with efficiency while also ensuring
fairness and negativing the fear of unchecked centralized power"); see also
Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 258, 279 (1978) (noting that besides ensuring accountability
and fairness, "[ilt is equally important .. . to provide mechanisms that will
not delay or frustrate substantive regulatory programs")
54. See generally THOMAS 0. McGARITY, SIDNEY SHAPIRO & DAVID
BOLLIER, SOPHISTICATED SABOTAGE: THE INTELLECTUAL GAMES USED TO
SUBVERT RESPONSIBLE REGULATION (2004).
55. See infra notes 110-122 and accompanying text (noting that industry
dominance in presenting policy information prepares the way for this result).
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delegitimize government.56
III. INFORMATION CAPTURE
The comparative advantage that regulated entities have in
organizing to influence pubic policy can produce capture through
public choice dynamics. But, as noted, the public choice
description of policy-making is a partial one because it fails to
account for the fact that public officials have other-regarding or
public interest motives.5 7 Unfortunately, capture can occur even
in these circumstances. The instrument of capture in these
circumstances is the dominance of business interests in the
presentation of information to the agency.
A. The Asymmetry
A study of registered lobbyists found that eighty-one percent
of the lobbyists who sought to influence environmental and
natural-resource issues in Congress and the Executive Branch
represented business or trade associations, while fifteen percent
represented public interest groups.58 A similar study of registered
lobbyists found that businesses constituted forty-one percent of
the total number of lobbyists, trade associations constituted
twenty-two percent, and non-profit and citizens groups together
constituted fourteen percent.59 Other studies confirm this
imbalance, 60 although some studies suggest that public interest
56. See infra notes 94-109 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
58. Scott R. Furlong, Exploring Interest Group Participation in Executive
Branch Policymaking, in THE INTEREST GROUP CONNECTION 282, 290-91 (Paul
S. Herrnson et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005).
59. Frank R. Baumgartner & Beth L. Leech, Interest Niches and Policy
Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics, 63
J. POL. 1191, 1195 (2001).
60. See, e.g., Kay Lehman Schlozman & Traci Burch, Political Voice in
an Age of Inequality, in AMERICA AT RISK: THREATS TO LIBERAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 140, 159 (Robert Faulkner & Susan
Shell eds., 2009) (of the representatives listed in the Washington
Representatives directory, corporations are about thirty-five percent, thirteen
percent are trade and business groups, and four percent are public interest
groups); Kay Lehman Schlozman & John T. Tierney, More of the Same:
Washington Pressure Group Activity in a Decade of Change, 45 J. POL. 351,
375-76 (1983) (of the organizations with a Washington presence, corporations
constituted approximately twenty-two percent, trade and business groups
constituted thirty-two percent, and citizens groups, civil rights groups,
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groups have a somewhat more robust presence in Washington
than the previous statistics indicate.6 1
1. EPA Rulemaking
This imbalance carries through to participation in
rulemaking. When Wendy Wagner and her coauthors examined
thirty-nine hazardous air pollutant rulemakings at EPA, they
found that industry (companies and industrial associations)
participated in substantially more rulemaking proceedings than
public interest groups, filed many more comments in each
proceeding, and had far more informal contacts with the agency
prior to the notice of proposed rulemaking.
Business interests filed an average of eighty-one percent of
the total comments concerning each proposed rule.62 Moreover,
while business interests submitted comments in all thirty-nine
rulemakings, public interest groups submitted comments in less
than one-half (forty-eight percent) of the rulemakings.63 Finally,
when both business and public interest groups filed comments,
business interests filed many more comments. Business interests
submitted an average of thirty-five comments per rule, while
public interest groups filed an average of 2.4 comments per rule. 4
Business interests also dominated the pre-rule stage. They
had an average of 170 times more informal communications with
EPA prior to the notice of proposed rulemaking than did public
interest groups.65  These included meetings, phone calls, and
letters. Business interests had an average of eighty-four informal
contacts per rule, as compared to 0.7 contacts per rule by public
interest groups.66
minority organizations, and advocates for the poor constituted twelve
percent).
61. See, e.g., FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BETH L. LEECH, BASIC INTERESTS:
THE IMPORTANCE OF GROUPS IN POLITICS AND IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 111 (1998)
(finding that for-profit groups make up thirty-eight percent of the interest
group population, nonprofit groups make up thirty-three percent, and citizens
groups make up twenty-four percent).
62. Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the
Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA's Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63
ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 128 (2011).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 128-29.
65. Id. at 125.
66. Id.
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This study confirmed the results of several earlier studies.
Some analysts measured the number of rulemakings in which
business and public interest groups participated.67 Other studies
compared the total number of comments that were filed by
business interests and public interest groups.6 8 Business interests
dominated the rulemaking process under either measure.
2. OIRA Meetings
A study done for the Center for Progressive Reform (CPR)
demonstrates the same imbalance occurs at the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), when it undertakes
the review of agency rules. 69 The authors studied 6194 separate
OIRA "reviews" of regulatory proposals and final rules conducted
during the period from October 16, 2001 until June 1, 2011, which
precipitated 1080 meetings with OIRA staff involving 5759
67. Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the
Administrative Process, 98 CoLUM. L. REV. 1, 129 (1998) (citing an
unpublished dissertation by Cary Coglianese finding that regulated
industries constituted fifty-nine percent of all participants in twenty-five
significant EPA rules promulgated under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) between 1989 and 1991, while groups representing
environmental and citizen interests constituted four percent); Scott R.
Furlong & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Interest Group Participation in Rule
Making: A Decade of Change, 15 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 353, 361
(2005) (finding that twice as many business groups reported that they
participated in rulemakings than did public interest groups); see generally
Scott R. Furlong, Interest Group Influence on Rule Making, 29 ADMIN. & Soc.
325, 338 (1997) (concluding that "certain interest groups have advantages in
influencing regulatory policy that other interest groups do not enjoy").
68. Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making
Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PuB. ADMIN. RES. &
THEORY 245, 252-53 (1998) (finding that corporations, public utilities, and
trade associations filed between 66.7% and 100% of the comments for eight
rulemakings at two agencies); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A
Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S.
Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 133 (2006) (finding that business interests filed
fifty-seven percent of the total comments at four agencies, nonbusiness,
nongovernmental interests submitted twenty-two percent of the comments,
and public interest groups constituted six percent of the previous category).
69. RENA STEINZOR, MICHAEL PATOKA & JAMES GOODWIN, CTR. FOR
PROGRESSIVE REFORM, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS AT THE WHITE HOUSE: How
POLITICS TRUMPS PROTECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH, WORKER SAFETY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (2011), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/
OIRAMeetings1111.pdf.
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participants.70  Sixty-five percent of the meeting participants
represented industry interests, which was about five times the
number of attendees who represented public interest groups.7 1
Nearly ninety-five percent of the lawyers, consultants, and
lobbyists who attended these meetings represented business
interests as compared to only 2.5% who represented public
interest groups. 72
At the same time, most of the meetings that occurred involved
only industry related representatives. Seventy-three percent of
the meetings involved only industry representatives with no
public interest participation, while seven percent of the meetings
attracted participation from public interest groups but not
industry.73 Thus, there were ten times more meetings at OIRA in
which there was no public interest present than there were
meetings in which there was no industry representative present.
B. The Impact
The empirical evidence indicates that business interests have
more lobbyists, participate more frequently in filing rulemaking
comments, have far more informal contacts with regulators than
do public interest groups, and dominate meetings at OIRA. This
dominance undoubtedly leads to capture, but it is difficult to
determine the precise extent to which this happens.
1. Where there is Smoke, There Is Fire
Knowledgeable observers have long contended asymmetrical
information produces capture. In a 1960 report to President
Kennedy, James Landis noted that industry dominance has a
"daily machine-gun-like impact on both [an] agency and its staff"
that tends to create an industry bias in the agency's outlook.74
More recently, Howard Latin has observed:
Industry representatives appear regularly in agency
proceedings and can usually afford to offer detailed
70. Id. at 5.
71. Id. at 19.
72. Id. at 18-19.
73. Id. at 215.
74. JAMEs M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE
PRESIDENT-ELECT 71 (1960).
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comments and criticisms on possible agency decisions,
while environmental groups intervene on an intermittent
basis and the unorganized public seldom participates at
all. This routine asymmetry will increase agency
responsiveness to industry criticisms. No matter how
sincere and public-spirited officials are when appointed, a
process of negative feedback will produce shifts toward
the positions espoused by regulated parties.75
The psychological literature backs up these observations.
Psychological testing has revealed that people are subject to an
availability heuristic, which causes them to overestimate the
probability of events based on the information most immediately
available to them. 76  As a result, if most of the information
submitted to an agency reflects an industry view of regulatory
issues, regulators are likely to be over-influenced by this
experience, leading them to form generalizations that undermine
their capacity to visualize other policy alternatives. This means
that over time regulators will take on the point of view of industry
that it is over-regulated, and they will perceive policy issues
through the lens of that perspective.
This potential for information capture is exacerbated by "filter
failure," as Wendy Wagner has explained.77 Business oriented
groups overwhelm an "overstretched" agency staff with "[a]
continuous barrage of letters, telephone calls, meetings, follow-up
memoranda, formal comments, post-rule comments, petitions for
reconsideration, and notices of appeal ... over the life cycle of a
rulemaking ... ."78 Because the agency is required by law to
respond to all significant comments, 79 it cannot "shield itself from
75. Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and
the New Clean Air Act, 21 ENvTL. L. 1647, 1673 (1991).
76. SCoTT PLous, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING
121 (1993); Norbert Schwarz & Leigh Ann Vaughn, The Availability Heuristic
Revisited: Ease of Recall and Content of Recall as Distinct Sources of
Information, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT 103, 112 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); Daniel Kahneman,
Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM.
ECON. REV. 1449, 1451 (2003).
77. Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and
Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1321 (2010).
78. Id. at 1325.
79. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240,
245 (2d Cir. 1977) (reversing an FDA regulation governing good practices for
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this flood of information and focus on developing its own expert
conception of the project."8 o In theory, public interest groups could
help the agency separate the wheat from the chaff, but they "often
lack the time, the resources, or the expertise to continue reviewing
all of the information that becomes part of the rulemaking record,"
particularly concerning more complex and technical issues.8 1
2. Agency Bias
While there appears to be a substantial potential for
information capture, the empirical evidence is mixed. Some
studies have found that business dominance produces pro-
industry outcomes. 82  Professor Wagner and her coauthors, for
example, found that EPA mostly changed rules in the direction
favored by industry.83 Moreover, the number of changes that EPA
made to weaken a rule increased as the number of industry
comments increased.84 Other studies have been unable to confirm
that industry interests benefit from their dominance of the
whitefish in part because the FDA failed to respond to an important technical
comment in its final rule); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (holding that an
"agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action").
80. Wagner et al., supra note 62, at 1325.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Amy McKay & Susan Webb Yackee, Interest Group
Competition on Federal Agency Rules, 35 AM. POL. RES. 336, 349-50 (2007)
(finding that when the majority of comments urge less regulation, the agency
is more likely to reduce the stringency of the final rule); Susan Webb Yackee,
Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of Interest Group Comments
on Federal Agency Rulemaking, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 103, 114
(2005) (finding that agencies are likely to alter a proposed rule when
comments point in the same direction concerning the stringency of the rule,
and that agencies are less likely to change a proposed rule when comments
urge changes in opposing directions); Yackee & Yackee, supra note 68, at
135-36 (finding that business interests had a greater influence on rules than
public interest groups and that comments from business interests predict a
greater probability that a final rule will be less stringent than the proposed
rule).
83. The study found that there were an average of twenty-two
significant issues in each rulemaking, EPA on average made changes to the
final rule concerning about one-half of these issues, and that eighty-three
percent of these changes weakened the rule in some manner. Wagner et al.,
supra note 62, at 130-31.
84. Id. at 131.
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administrative process. 5
One potential reason for the mixed evidence is that public
interest groups may not be the only entities that represent the
interests of the public in a rulemaking proceeding. State and local
governments and other non-business, non-government entities
also file comments. Further, not all business related comments
seek the same ends. Some corporations (or trade associations)
may find it in their self-interest to support stronger regulation.
Agencies may also vary in their capacity to create their own policy
information and to avoid filter failure. However, the defunding of
agencies, discussed earlier,86 suggests that this capacity is
eroding.
3. OIRA Bias
The empirical evidence linking industry dominance of OIRA
meetings to pro-industry changes in a rule is also mixed.
According to the CPR study discussed earlier, it is common for
OIRA to make changes in proposed rules, but it is more likely that
a change will occur when a rule is the subject of a meeting. OIRA
made changes to eighty-five percent of the proposed rules for
which a meeting occurred, while it made changes sixty-six percent
of the time that no meeting took place concerning a rule.87
Although meetings almost always lead to changes in a rule,
we do not know whether the change was significant or
insignificant. More importantly, we do not know whether
industry dominance of the meetings led OIRA to weaken proposed
rules. But we do know that OIRA often intervenes to weaken
proposed rules,8 8 and there is evidence that it almost always does
85. See, e.g., SHELDON KAMIENIECKI, CORPORATE AMERICA AND
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: How OFTEN DOES BUSINESS GET ITS WAY? 250-56
(2006) (finding that business groups did not have substantial influence in
environmental rulemaking); WESLEY A. MAGAT ET AL., RULES IN THE MAKING:
A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY AGENCY BEHAVIOR 143-45, 157 (1986)
(finding no statistically significant empirical support for the hypothesis that
active participation in federal rulemaking by firms results in weaker
regulatory standards for those firms); Golden, supra note 68, at 260-61
(finding no evidence of "agency capture" despite the dominance of business
interests).
86. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
87. STEINZOR, PATOKA, & GOODWIN, supra note 69, at 55..
88. David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L.
REV. 335, 355 (2006) (reviewing a range of academic and government reports
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so when it makes changes, at least when the changes involve
significant rules. 89
Industry's efforts to influence OIRA may involve preaching to
the choir. The desk officers in OIRA, who review proposed and
final regulations, reflect the narrow, economic perspective of their
training and of the organization in which they work, which is
composed almost entirely of economists and leads to a paramount
concern about regulatory costs.90 This suggests that OIRA may
have an anti-regulatory bias regardless of industry domination of
the meeting process. Nevertheless, it is likely that industry
domination fortifies OIRA's pre-existing bias, and it may well
amplify it, for the reasons discussed earlier concerning why
asymmetrical information produces capture.91
IV. DEFLECTING PUBLIC OPPOSITION
While the extent of capture, however it occurs, is unknown, it
seems unlikely that it does not occur at all. And, even if industry
domination only causes capture some of the time, there is still a
problem, putting the public needlessly at risk.92 Yet, by and large,
capture is unopposed by the public, whose interests are adversely
affected. Public choice dynamics may explain this outcome. The
public may fail to act because of collective action problems. 93
There is another explanation for public passivity. There has been
an expensive and extensive campaign by business interest to
influence public opinion, and progressive interests have failed to
match these efforts. As a result, the business community has
headed off public opposition to their efforts to reduce regulation,
even when the public would benefit from stricter regulation.
that show that OIRA review slowed and reduced the stringency of
environmental, safety, and health regulation in "dozens" of cases).
89. Id. at 365 (examining twenty-five rules that a Government
Accountability Office (GAO) study found had been significantly affected by
OIRA in 2001-2002, and finding that OIRA's recommended changes would
have reduced regulatory protections in twenty-four, while the remaining
change was neutral).
90. Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit
Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 433, 466
(2008).
91. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (arguing that even
occasional capture is a problem for the public).
93. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
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A. The Air War
Tom McGarity describes the effort to influence public opinion
about regulation as the "air war."94  As in an actual military
campaign, it is in support of the "ground war," the direct effort to
obtain outcomes favorable to the side sponsoring the air war.95
And, as in a military campaign, the air war softens up the enemy
to make it more likely that the ground war will succeed.
Conservative interests have substantially outspent progressive
interests in the air war.
We lack an authoritative estimate of the total amount spent
by conservative funders to influence public opinion, but available
information suggests the amount is substantial. According to one
estimate, conservative foundations and funders spent over one
billion dollars in the 1990s to make right-wing theory the
foundation of public policy.96  Another source estimates that
conservative sources spent $1.8 billion dollars on influencing
public policy as of 2001.97 According to this source, seventy-nine
conservative foundations had supported the activities of 331
organizations that sought to reshape public policy at the federal,
state and local levels.98 A third analyst estimates there has been
roughly three billion dollars spent in support of conservative
public policy ideas over thirty years.99 The Olin Foundation,
alone, invested around fifty million dollars in support of law and
economics scholarship, responding to what its executive director
called a 'call to arms' in 'defense of capitalism."'
00
94. McGarity, Freedom to Harm, supra note 35, at 90.
95. Id. at 91.
96. DAVID CALLAHAN, NAT'L COMM. FOR RESPONSIVE PHILANTHROPY, $1
BILLION FOR IDEAS: CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS IN THE 1990s (1999), available
at http://www.commonwealinstitute.org/archive/1-billion-for-ideas-conserv
ative-think-tanks-in-the-1990s; David Callahan, $1 Billion for Conservative
Ideas, NATION, Apr. 26, 1999, at 21-23.
97. JEFF KREHELY ET AL., NAT'L COMM. FOR RESPONSIVE PHILANTHROPY,
Axis OF IDEOLOGY: CONSERVATIVE FOUNDATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 10 (2004);
available at www.commasite.com/FileDownload.cfm?file=Axis-of
Ideology.pdf.
98. Id. at 7.
99. Lewis H. Lapham, Tentacles of Rage: The Republican Propaganda
Mill, A Brief History, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Sept. 2004, at 31, 32 (citing Rob
Stein, a former Democratic Strategist, as the source of the estimate).
100. Martha T. McCluskey, Thinking With Wolves: Left Legal Theory
After the Right's Rise, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1215 (2007) (quoting James
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We also lack authoritative data concerning how much
progressive interests have spent to influence public opinion, but it
appears that conservative funding is significantly greater.10 One
political strategist estimates that right-wing think tanks received
$295 million in support between 2003 and 2005, while left-wing
think tanks received just $75 million in the same period.102 The
budgets of the top eight progressive social groups, according to
another estimate, totaled less than twenty-five percent of the
budgets of the top five conservative think tanks in 1995.103 The
annual budget of the Institute for Policy Studies, one of the few
left-wing multi-issue think tanks, would be enough to run the
Heritage Foundation, one of the most prominent multi-issue right-
wing think tanks, for about thirteen working days.104 A study of
foundation support estimated that only one percent of total
foundation spending went to progressive social movements. 0 5
This imbalance has occurred despite the fact that liberal
foundations, such as the Ford Foundation, spend large amounts of
Piereson, the foundation's second executive director, James Piereson,
Opinion, You Get What You Pay For, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2004 at A10).
101. See McGarity, Freedom to Harm, supra note 35, at 384 (noting the
necessity to establish a progressive idea infrastructure similar to the one
established by conservative forces); id. at 386 (noting the reluctance of
progressive foundations to fund an idea infrastructure to counter the
conservative infrastructure); Eric Alterman, Think Again: Money Matters,
Part II, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Oct. 20, 2004),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/10/b225778.html (observing
that "[tihe far-right wing enjoys an enormous head start in training and
funding its voices to head out and preach their message to the American
people . . . ." and that "[w]ith hundreds of millions of dollars flying out of
conservative coffers in order to mold public opinion, the liberal side will never
have the resources to match them").
102. David Teather, Liberals Pledge Millions to Revive US Left, GUARDIAN
(Aug. 7, 2005, 8:52 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/aug/08/
usa.davidteather (quoting Rob Stein).
103. Sally Covington, How Conservative Philanthropies and Think Tanks
Transform US Policy, COVERT ACTION Q. (Winter 1998),
http://www.thirdworld traveler.com/Democracy/ConservThinkTanks.html.
104. Michael Shuman, Why Do Progressive Foundations Give too Little to
too Many?, NATION (Jan. 12, 1998), http://www.tni.org/print/65838 (based on
data available at the time).
105. J. Craig Jenkins & Abigail Halcli, Grassrooting the System? The
Development and Impact of Social Movement Philanthropy, 1953-1990, in
PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS: NEW SCHOLARSHIP, NEW POSSIBILITIES 229, 230
(Ellen Condliffe Lagemann ed., 1999).
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money, perhaps even more than conservative foundations.1 06 But,
unlike conservative supporters, liberal foundations have not spent
their money on creating and developing an intellectual
infrastructure to influence public opinion about government and
its programs.10 7 Instead, they have sponsored research to improve
social and regulatory programs, without considering the need to
defend these programs to the public. 0 8
Conservative voices will claim that their ideas are winning
because of their popularity with the public. This would be a more
credible claim if the battle to influence the public were not so one-
sided. As Andrew Rich notes, "conservatives are still winning in
the war of ideas, and that success cannot be chalked up only to the
power of their ideas. It is because these ideas have a winning
organization behind them."l09
B. Frame Contests
One consequence of the disparity in funding can be seen in
the battle over framing public policy issues. A "policy frame" is a
heuristic used to organize, interpret and make sense of complex
policy issues.110 When individuals use different policy frames to
106. Robert 0. Bothwell, The Decline of Progressive Policy and the New
Philanthropy: Progressive Foundations and Other Alternatives to Mainstream
Foundations Are Created and Become Substantial, But Fail to Reverse the
Policy Decline, COMM-ORG (2003), http://comm-org.wisc.edulpapers2003/
bothwell/bothwell.htm (noting that the Ford Foundation gives away more
than $400 million dollars per year).
107. Id.
108. Id.; see also Andrew Rich, War of Ideas: Why Mainstream and
Liberal Foundations and the Think Tanks They Support Are Losing in the
War of Ideas in American Politics, STAN. Soc. INNOVATION REV., Spring 2005,
at 18 ("Nonconservative foundations - what might be labeled 'middle of the
road,' 'mainline,' or 'liberal foundations' - have devoted far more resources
than conservatives to influencing thinking about public policy. This spending
simply has not been as deliberate or effective."); Shuman, supra note 104
("progressive funders have much to learn from the right, and need to start
radically rethinking their practices and priorities"); Convington, supra note
103 ("In funding a policy movement rather than specific program areas, [key
conservative foundations] distinguish themselves from the philanthropic
mainstream, which has long maintained a pragmatic, non-ideological and
field-specific approach to the grant making enterprise.").
109. Rich, supra note 108, at 25.
110. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-
Reformation: Restoring Faith in Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV.
689, 690 (2000) [hereinafter Shapiro, Counter-Reformation] (discussing how
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integrate facts, values, theories and interests, they end up
supporting different public policies. Different interests therefore
compete to have their policy frame to dominate public opinion.111
Policy frames are established through "policy stories" that
identify a social problem and what conditions caused the problem.
The goal of a policy story is to characterize the problem and the
source of the problem in a manner that supports the political
interests of the group telling the story.11 2 Interest groups "look for
causes not only to understand how the world works but to assign
responsibility for problems."" 3 The goal is to "tell a story in which
one set of people are oppressors and another are victims.""14 This
makes political conflicts something more than "empirical claims
about sequences of events. They are fights about the possibility of
control and the assignment of responsibility.""l5
Progressive framing efforts are a version of a generic story
that blames safety, health and environmental risks on the
irresponsible behavior of the business community. The "solution"
suggested by the story is additional regulation, which is the goal
of the public interest groups telling the story.116
Conservative interests tell a counter-story. They propose that
excessive government regulation has reduced economic growth
and individual freedom. The "solution" suggested by the story is
less regulation, which is the goal of the corporate interests telling
the story.' 17 Consider, for example, the recent effort by regulatory
opponents to blame regulation for the country's slow economic
framing works).
111. Charlotte Ryan & Samuel Alexander, "Reframing" The Presentation
of Environmental Law and Policy, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 563, 568
(2006). Like other heuristics, policy frames are selective in the sense that
they emphasize some aspects of reality and relegate other aspects to the
background. Individuals are often not aware that this is occurring. Id. at
567.
112. Shapiro, Counter-Reformation, supra note 110, at 690.
113. DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION
MAKING 189 (Revised ed. 2002).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 197.
116. See Shapiro, Counter-Reformation, supra note 110, at 692-94
(describing the policy story used by environmental and consumer interests).
117. Id. at 697-703 (describing the policy story used by anti-regulatory
forces).
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recovery.11 8  This accusation, which is captured by their
description "job killing regulation," seeks to deflect the public from
remembering that it was the lack of regulation of Wall Street that
precipitated the very recession from which the country is trying to
recover.1 19
Conservative interests have been able to displace the policy
frame that progressives used in the 1960s to obtain public support
for government regulation, and replace it with one that
delegitimizes government and deters support for additional
regulation.120  In this manner, the national agenda has been
shifted from its focus on the undesirable conduct of corporations to
the undesirable conduct of the government.121 For example,
although there is no empirical support to back up the claim that
regulation kills jobs,122 the public is less likely to hear this
rebuttal if public interest groups are underfinanced.
The success of regulatory opponents in establishing their
policy frames exacerbates the collective action problems that
prevent the pubic from organizing to achieve more regulatory
protection. Not only is it difficult and expensive to mobilize the
public, the public is less likely to recognize when their self-interest
lies in supporting additional and more effective regulation. This
lack of recognition assists conservative interests in achieving and
maintaining capture through the various mechanisms described
earlier.
C. Deep Capture
The lack of public opposition to efforts to reduce or eliminate
government regulation is related to the conservative funding
118. See, e.g., Susan Duclos, Obama's Answer to Job Killing Regulations?
ADD 350+ MORE!!!, WAKE UP AMERICA (Aug. 4, 2011, 1:26 PM),
http://www.wwwwakeupamericans-spree.blogspot.com/2011/08/obamas-
answer-to-job-killing.html.
119. See McGarity, Freedom to Harm, supra note 35, at 357 ("That the
business community's influence infrastructure could credibly invoke a
recession caused by lax regulation of financial institutions to support
deregulation was a testament to the success of its idea infrastructure in
molding public perceptions about the proper role of government. . .
120. Id. at 8-9.
121. Shapiro, Counter-Reformation, supra note 110, at 702.
122. See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 23, at 15-17 (discussing the lack of
evidence that regulation causes job losses).
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advantage in framing public policy issues. Jon Hanson and David
Yosifon suggest another way that the conservative air war has
laid the groundwork for regulatory capture. 123
They focus on the psychological tendency of individuals to
consider human behavior as resulting from the choices that people
freely make, known as "individual dispositions." 24  Like other
heuristics, this one helps people to filter information. It is easier
to attribute outcomes to individual disposition than it is to sort out
the extent to which outside forces have influenced individual
behavior. 125  Like other heuristics, it can lead to attribution
errors. Individuals miss the extent to which behavior results from
"situational factors," such as the manipulation of individuals by
others. The result is "situational factors are cognitively hidden
(often in plain sight), easily camouflaged and naturalized as mere
background."l 26
The fact that individuals are prone to miss situational factors
makes it attractive for conservative interests to use their funding
advantage to reinforce individual disposition as a way of gaining
power. 127  Conservative interests gain power because the
reinforcement of individual dispositionalism leads people to
believe that government regulation is unnecessary. This frame of
mind, for example, leads individuals to believe they make free
choices in market transactions, creating a presumption against
regulation. After all, if consumers make free choices in markets,
government regulation will reduce consumer welfare.128
Regulation is not even justified to reduce health and safety risks
because individuals "are presumed to be choosing the inevitable
123. Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003).
124. Id. at 136-37.
125. Id. at 137.
126. Id. at 195.
127. See id.
128. If consumers are dispositionalist, they act according to a set of
preferences that only they can know about. The only way to maximize
consumer welfare is therefore to allow consumers to purchase whatever
products and services they prefer. As profit-making entities, corporations
have a strong interest in the satisfaction of consumer preferences, and, when
they are profitable, this indicates that corporations are serving the public's
interests. "In short, profit-maximizing corporations act in the public
interest." Id. at 226-27.
20121 247
248 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:221
risks that gave rise to those harms."129 And even if regulation is
sometimes justified, there is a high burden on the government to
defend its actions.
Dispositionalism also leads citizens to distrust regulators
because it supports public choice arguments that government
officials cannot be trusted. 130 The assumption is that regulators,
like others, are free to choose to act in self-interested ways. The
fact that public servants may be substantially motivated by
professionalism and agency culture to serve the public is not
apparent because a dispositionalist outlook causes citizens to
overlook the influence that organizational culture and professional
training can have on people. 131
When business efforts to reinforce dispostionalism are
successful, they lead to what Hanson and Yosifon describe as
"deep capture," which operates differently than the shallow
capture that results from public choice dynamics. Whereas
shallow capture attempts to exploit individual self-interest, deep
capture targets "the way that people think and the way that they
think they think." 32
The public is unlikely to understand how situational factors
impact behavior "unless the situation is thrust upon us in the form
of another hard-to-miss actor. . . ."133 This means citizens are
more likely to see the need for regulation when there is some crisis
that suggests corporations have acted in ways that have
endangered the public. It is therefore not an accident that most
new regulatory legislation passed by Congress comes after such a
crisis. 134 For example, Congress enacted additional regulation of
the financial sector after the recent catastrophic collapse on Wall
Street.135
Nevertheless, the strong hold that dispositionalism has on the
public is indicated by the fact that business interests have found it
129. Id. at 227.
130. Id.
131. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing the other-
regarding motives of public servants and the sources of these motives).
132. Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 123, at 214.
133. Id. at 157.
134. See McGarity, Freedom to Harm, supra note 35, at 329 (relating how
strong regulatory legislation follows a profound crisis).
135. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
REGULATORY CAPTURE
worthwhile to engage in a concerted campaign to blame
government regulation for the recession that was actually caused
by the failure to regulate Wall Street.136 Moreover, despite the
largest oil spill in American history, legislative efforts to address
deepwater drilling died in the Senate, indicating that not every
crisis is sufficient to generate reform legislation. 3 7
V. SOLUTIONS
Given the breadth and depth of capture, and the political
influence of business interests, remediation will not be easy. The
first step is for progressive forces to convince the public of the
need for reform. The difficulty is that the conservative air war
has dulled the public's enthusiasm to establish more effective
regulatory programs. Sustained support for stronger regulation is
not likely to occur until progressive interests establish an
alternative idea infrastructure that can compete successfully in
the air war. There have been steps in this direction, but so far
these efforts have fallen short of the intensive campaign by
conservative interests. 138
Assuming there is the necessary political will to act, two
general approaches are available. Regulatory agencies can be
made more resistant to the influence of business interests, and
there are transparency measures that would alert the public to
the potential existence of regulatory capture.
A. Make Agencies More Resistant to Capture
When the political will to act exists, there are a number of
ways that Congress can make agencies more resistant to capture.
Rachel Barkow recommends permitting agencies to submit their
own budgets to Congress (making them less susceptible to White
House political pressure on behalf of business interests);139
establishing qualifications for administrators (limiting the
136. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
137. See McGarity, Freedom to Harm, supra note 35, at 343 (discussing
the failure to pass legislation to regulate offshore drilling).
138. Id. at 384-85 (discussing progressive efforts to fight the air war).
139. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEx. L. REv. 15, 43 (2010). The same goal could be
accomplished by requiring regulated entities to pay fees to support an agency
budget. Id. at 44.
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President's ability to appoint administrators based solely on their
anti-regulatory ideology);140 establishing agencies with broad
jurisdictions (making them more likely to resist political pressure
from any one set of interests);141 eliminating statutory conflicts of
interest (which require agencies to promote and regulate an
industry);142 limiting preemption (allowing state regulators to fill
regulatory gaps);143 and making wider use of public advocates
(who represent otherwise unrepresented citizens in regulatory
proceedings).144
Lawrence Baxter also suggests how we might make agencies
more resistant to capture.145 We could finance weaker interest
groups or have them represented by state attorney generals or
other surrogates (making the regulatory process more
pluralistic);146 revive the concept of private attorney generals
(ensuring citizens can challenge captured agencies in court);147
rotate key officials (to decrease their susceptibility to capture);148
establish stronger ethical rules (to forbid post-government
employment that leads to capture);149 and rely more on Inspector
Generals or similar private, independent entities (to spot and
reveal capture).150
I find all of these suggestions worthy of serious consideration,
and I would add one more. An expert and professional civil
service is more likely to have other-regarding motivations and is
more likely to avoid information capture. With an effective civil
service, an agency has a greater capacity to vet the validity of
industry policy proposals, and to decide for itself which policies
best advance the goals of its regulatory mandates. In short, the
country needs to make the civil service more capable of finding the
public interest on its own.
140. Id. at 45-49.
141. Id. at 50.
142. Id. at 50-51.
143. Id. at 53-55.
144. Id. at 62-63.
145. Baxter, supra note 5, at 190-99. Baxter stresses that the regulatory
process is dynamic and that efforts to avoid capture should be reassessed and
adjusted over time. Id. at 188-90.
146. Id. at 191-92.
147. Id. at 192.
148. Id. at 196-97.
149. Id. at 197-98.
150. Id. at 198-99.
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The public choice literature assumes that regulatory officials
are self-interested, but there is considerable evidence that public
officials also have other-regarding motives. 151 It is possible to
design bureaucratic institutions to take advantage of, and
strengthen, these other-regarding motives. 152 A civil servant with
a strong commitment to public service is more likely to resist
industry arguments to weaken regulations unless he or she can
independently verify that such policies in fact serve the public at
large. 153
Expert and capable civil servants are also more likely to avoid
information capture. Rather than depending on the expertise of
industry, they will have their own expertise. Likewise, effective
civil servants will be in a position to seek out their own sources of
information, rather than relying on the information brought to
them.
Finally, the creation of an effective civil service should reduce
the revolving door. Agencies will not find it necessary to hire
persons from industry in order to gain the expertise they need to
regulate. And those in government service will have less incentive
to move to private industry if the civil service becomes an
attractive career, one in which they can expect market levels of
compensation and the opportunity for advancement.
This is a tall order. As mentioned earlier, regulatory agencies
are seriously underfunded.154 Nevertheless, nothing less than a
complete overhaul of the civil service system is necessary. Unless
and until we pay civil servants compensation closer to what they
can earn in the private sector, the best and brightest will continue
to leave for the greener pastures of industry.155 As well, it is
151. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
152. See Shapiro & Wright, supra note 18, at 587 (noting public managers
can "influence employee behavior by creating and maintaining an
organizational culture that promotes a mission orientation, a sense of public
service, and professionalism").
153. See id. at 616 ("When agency professionals, operating within the
parameters of their training and experience, present their understanding of
the law, science, and technology to agency leadership, they speak truth to
power.").
154. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
155. STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 210-211 (documenting pay
disparities); Baxter, supra note 5, at 195 (noting the need to pay higher
compensation).
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necessary to change how raises and promotions are determined.15 6
This is not all. An even more difficult step is to get our
political leaders to stop bashing the bureaucracy. John Kennedy,
with this declaration, "Ask not what your country can do for you-
ask what you can do for your country,"' 57 is about the last political
leader to consider government service as a noble calling.158 The
failure to regard the civil service as important to our nation's
destiny discourages bright, young people from joining government
and makes it difficult to retain them, if hired.159
B. Make Agencies More Transparent
Louis Brandeis famously observed, "Sunlight is said to be the
best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." 60
He saw transparency as effective in deterring capture because it
exposed to voters that their public officials have overlooked their
interests in favor of promoting the interests of regulated entities.
More disclosure remains a viable solution. First, it would
decrease the collective action costs of public interest groups. In
the absence of legislatively mandated disclosures, it is up to pro-
regulatory interests to ferret out and publicize information that
indicates regulatory capture, an expensive proposition. Second,
we know that individuals are less likely to retain their
dispositionalist outlook if there is evidence that situational factors
are responsible for social problems. More disclosure should
therefore make it more difficult for conservative interests to
156. STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 210-211.
157. President John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961), in
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JOHN F. KENNEDY:
CONTAINING THE PUBLIC MESSAGES, SPEECHS, AND STATEMENTS OF THE
PRESIDENT, JANUARY 20 To DECEMBER 31, 1961, at 1, 3 (1962).
158. See STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 126-129 (noting the
almost universal tendency of presidents and other elected officials to engage
in "bureaucracy bashing").
159. See R. Sam Garrett, James A. Thurber, A. Lee Fritschler & David H.
Rosenbloom, Assessing the Impact of Bureaucracy Bashing by Electoral
Campaigns, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 228, 234 (2006) (a 2006 study on the effects
of bureaucrat bashing found that senior managers in the government
repeatedly said that "bashing creates permanent and overwhelming negative
mental frames and political symbols for career bureaucrats, which affects
morale, recruitment, training, and overall work environment").
160. LouIs D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS
USE IT 92 (1913).
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sustain deep capture.
Michael Levine and Jennifer Forrence suggest that greater
transparency also deters self-interested behavior by government
officials. 161 They observe how legislators and regulators present
themselves, respectively, as public servants and civil servants to
the public. This behavior indicates their commitment to the
general welfare, which Levine and Forrence contend produces
greater self-satisfaction than if government officials portrayed
themselves as beholden to regulated entities. 162  If this
characterization is correct, public officials will avoid self-
interested behavior because exposure of such behavior will be
humiliating to those involved. For legislators, it will also threaten
their reelection because they will have been revealed as lying to
the public.163
There are two types of disclosures that could reduce the
extent of capture. The first, and easier to achieve, would indicate
the extent of industry influence in agency policymaking. The
second type would measure agency outputs to determine whether
an agency is falling short of its statutory responsibilities. Neither
type of disclosure would prove that capture has occurred, but both
would raise a red flag that something is amiss.
1. Measures of Interest Group Influence
Agency administrators should be required to disclosure their
calendars, indicating with whom they have met, the institutional
affiliation of those persons, and a sufficient description of the
content of the meeting that the public can ascertain the purpose of
the meeting and the regulatory action to which it relates. There is
no current legal requirement that administrators keep a public
calendar, although officials at some agencies, such as the EPA, do
SO. 164
Agencies should also be required to compile summary
161. Levine & Forrence, supra note 18, at 185-91.
162. Id. at 175.
163. Id. at 186.
164. See, e.g., Senior Managers Schedule: Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator,
Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/Calendars_1?OpenView&RestrictTo
Category=Lisa%20P.%2OJackson.%2OAdministrator,%2OEnvironmental%20
Protection%20Agency (last visited Nov. 25, 2011).
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statistics regarding the meetings subject to the public c alendar
requirement. The statistics should indicate by category, such as
rulemaking, enforcement, etc., the number of meetings that have
taken place between the agency and business interests, public
interest groups, state and local officials, etc.
Finally, agencies should keep and publish statistics on who
files rulemaking comments. It is a huge task to develop these
types of statistics if the agency does not publish them, which is
why there should be a requirement that it do so.
At a time when agency resources are shrinking, 165 I hesitate
to recommend an extensive program of data collection and
publication. But costs can be minimized by building the collection
of this information into the electronic submission of written
materials to the agency. Anyone who submits written documents
to the agency can be required to answer some basic questions
concerning their identity, such as corporation, trade association,
etc. Agency personnel can spot check the accuracy of the
information. Similarly, agency staff can report on meetings by
entering data into a website in a manner that will permit the
publication of statistics about the meetings.
2. Measures ofAgency Success
Government can produce other types of information that
would give the public a better read on whether regulatory
agencies are fulfilling their mission to protect the public. Rachel
Barkow recommends that agencies should have the "authority to
study and publicize data that will be of interest to the public and
help energize the public to overcome collective action problems
and rally behind [an] agency." 166  For example, a consumer
protection agency could identify dangerous products and serves as
a means of generating public support for regulatory policies that
industry would oppose. 167
Rena Steinzor and I have proposed another type of
transparency that would also alert the public to capture. We
proposed that agencies should develop, publish and update
regulatory "metrics" that would measure the extent to which each
165. See supra notes 41 and accompanying text.
166. Barkow, supra note 139, at 59.
167. Id. at 59-60.
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agency has fallen short of legislatively mandated goals.168 Metrics
would be published on an agency website in a manner that makes
them easy to find and interpret.169
For example, the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires the EPA to
identify "criteria air pollutants," establish regulations that limit
public exposure to these pollutants, and to oversee the
development of "state implementation plans," which specify how
each state will bring its air quality into compliance with the
emissions limitations.170 The type of metric that we have in mind
would reveal the extent to which the air across the country meets
the regulatory limitations. This would be revealed in a manner
that is easy to interpret, such as whether the air is 50 percent in
compliance, or 60 percent in compliance, etc.
Over time, the public could assess whether EPA is making
reasonable progress towards 100 percent compliance. If the
agency has been stuck at the same percentage for a number of
years, or the air is getting worse, these disclosures would alert
Congress, the White House, and others with oversight authority-
as well as advocacy groups, the media, and the public-that EPA
is failing to succeed in its statutory mission.
It would not be easy to devise appropriate metrics or to obtain
the information that would be necessary to derive the appropriate
statistics, two problems that Professor Steinzor and I have
discussed.' 7 ' But it is worth doing, not only as an antidote to
capture, but to push legislators and the President into fixing other
problems with the regulatory system, if they are preventing
effective regulation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Despite the considerable attention paid to the concept of
regulatory capture, it remains difficult to determine when it
occurs, what causes it, and what to do about it. Despite these
difficulties, it is crucial to understand the dynamics of capture and
to find ways of heading it off. When there is under-regulation due
168. STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 185-191.
169. Id. at 190.
170. See 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (2006) (requiring the EPA to publish a list of air
pollutants); id. § 7409 (requiring the EPA to establish primary and secondary
ambient air quality standards).
171. STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 185-191.
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to capture, these results can be devastating, as the country's
recent experiences with the 2008 Wall Street collapse and the BP
oil spill demonstrate.
Capture is easy to diagnose when an agency is obviously
influenced by regulated entities and the policies it produces
clearly fail to protect the public. But restricting capture to this
definition misses subtler forms of capture in which the public
interest is thwarted by the consistent adoption of minimally
sufficient protection policies as a result of industry influence. This
situation also constitutes capture concerning environmental,
health, and safety statutes. In these statutes, Congress has
mandated the greatest degree of protection that is achievable
taking into account costs and other considerations. When an
agency consistently falls short of meeting its precautionary
mandate because of industry influence, it has been captured by
that influence.
Capture, however defined, is not easily remedied because
industry influence can result in multiple sources of capture.
These include passage of substantive legislation that favors
business interests, self-interested and ideological behavior by
administrators, the defunding of agencies, and the imposition of
procedural obstacles to rulemaking. More recently, we have
become aware that there can be information capture, which occurs
when most (and sometimes all) of the information concerning
proposed regulations available to an agency and OIRA comes from
industry sources. Moreover, capture has persisted because
business interests have successfully deflected potential public
opposition through an expensive and extensive public relations
campaign to delegitimize government which progressive interests
have failed to match.
Assuming there is the necessary political will to begin to
address the causes of capture, one option is to make agencies more
resistant to capture through institutional redesign. A number of
useful strategies to accomplish this goal have been proposed, but
prior analysis has overlooked the potential of rebuilding the civil
service as a strong bulwark against capture. This potential is
often overlooked because of the assumption in the public choice
literature that the civil service is self-interested and therefore
easily captured. This ignores how organizational culture and
professionalism can reinforce the other-regarding motives of civil
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servants, making them an effective counter-point to business
influence.
Another option is to increase transparency in the regulatory
process. Government can produce information that would give the
public a better read on whether regulatory agencies are fulfilling
their mission to protect the public. This essay proposes two such
approaches. First, Congress should require agencies to publish
information concerning the number of times they meet with
industry-related groups as compared to interest groups
representing consumers and other members of the public. Second,
Congress should require that agencies develop, publish and
update regulatory "metrics" that would measure the extent to
which each agency has fallen short of legislatively mandated
goals. Over time, these measurements would alert the public to
when agencies are stalled in their efforts to protect the public or
are backsliding in such efforts.
As a best-selling novelist once remarked, "Nothing that's
worthwhile is ever easy."l 72 Unfortunately, this remark describes
all too well the difficulty of rooting out capture. But the protection
of the American public depends on it.
172. NIcoLAs SPARKS, MESSAGE INABOTILE (1998).
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